The Gender Game of Parenting Responsibilities: A Study on the Decisionmaking Model of Women’s Participation in the Workplace

Abstract

Despite the increasing educational attainment of women and the overall rise in female labor force participation, it remains common for women to withdraw from the labor market during marriage and childbearing. After giving birth, women face the choice of whether to return to the labor market or to take care of their children full-time. This choice is often attributed to the subjective will of the women themselves or the division of labor within the family, with less consideration given to the role of institutional factors, gender roles, and the negotiation mechanisms within the family. This section, based on a game theory perspective, assumes that both spouses are completely rational and establishes a simple two-person non-cooperative game model to explore the impact of the division of child-rearing responsibilities on women’s labor market participation. The results show that, in the absence of government intervention measures, there will be an equilibrium solution within the family where the wife withdraws from the labor market and the husband takes on less child-rearing tasks. However, with the implementation of public policies such as parental leave, allowances, or flexible employment, the game outcome may change, leading to a more equal division of child-rearing responsibilities and facilitating women’s re-employment. This paper argues that women’s withdrawal from work is not a completely autonomous choice but rather a result based on the established institutional environment and the distribution of decision-making power within the family.